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Abstract 
Labor  market  programs  may  aﬀect  unemployed  individuals’  behavior  before  they 
enroll. Such ex ante eﬀects may diﬀer according to ethnic origin. We apply a novel 
method that relates self-reported perceived treatment rates and job search behav­
ioral outcomes, such as the reservation wage or search intensity, to each other. We 
compare German native workers with migrants with a Turkish origin or Central and 
Eastern European (including Russian) background. Job search theory is used to de­
rive theoretical predictions. We examine the omnibus ex ante eﬀect of the German 
ALMP system, using the novel IZA Evaluation Data Set, which includes self-reported 
assessments of the variables of interest as well as an unusually detailed amount of in­
formation on behavior, attitudes and past outcomes. We ﬁnd that the ex ante threat 
eﬀect on the reservation wage and search eﬀort varies considerably among the groups 
considered. 
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 1  Introduction 
Migrants are often disadvantaged with respect to their labor market outcomes. In Germany 
the  unemployment  rate  of  foreign  born  men  was  11.8%  in  2008,  whereas  only  6.8%  of 
native born men were unemployed. For women the ﬁgures are similar at 13.1% vs. 6.8% 
(see OECD, 2010). Past research has shown that diﬀerences in employment and earnings 
between natives and migrants persist, even when controlling for individual characteristics, 
such as education and age (Algan et al., 2010). 
Active labor market policy programs (ALMP) are common tools to improve the labor 
market  outcomes  of  the  unemployed.  Potentially,  these  programs  could  be  particularly 
helpful for unemployed migrants. Migrants may lack skills speciﬁc to the national labor 
market, and these skills might be easily transferred with the help of labor market policies 
such as training programs. 
ALMP can have ex ante and ex post eﬀects. Evaluation studies typically focus on ex 
post eﬀects, i.e. on the eﬀect of actual participation. However, ex ante eﬀects, i.e. the eﬀects 
that occur before participation, may also exert a large eﬀect on unemployment durations. 
If individuals expect large beneﬁts from a treatment then they may postpone their job 
search until after the treatment. In this case the ex ante eﬀect is negative, and the average 
realized unemployment durations of participants and non-participants may be larger than 
in the absence of the program. Knowledge of ex ante eﬀects is thus an important input 
for the evaluation of the program and for the assessment of possible modiﬁcations of the 
program. For example, if the ex post eﬀect of having been trained on the exit rate to work 
is positive, whereas the ex ante eﬀect on this rate is negative, then this may suggest that 
the program is best oﬀered early on during the unemployment spell. 
Ex ante eﬀects require individuals to have some knowledge about the existence of ALMP 
and about the process leading to participation. The ALMP participation probability is a 
determinant of the optimal job search strategy and will aﬀect the outcome of interest. 
Consider, for example, a training program that upgrades skills for a certain profession. 
Knowledge of the rate that an individual can participate in such a program can be valuable 
for the individual. If an individual ﬁnds out that her individual rate is high then it becomes 
attractive for the individual to reduce her search eﬀort as participation could lead to higher 
wages. 
In this paper we investigate whether migrants and natives react similarly to the expec­
tation of participating in an ALMP, and whether diﬀerent types of migrants (as captured 
by the region of origin) react similarly or not. There are a number of reasons why the 
migrant status may aﬀect ex ante eﬀects. First, ex ante eﬀects are aﬀected by the extent 
to which individuals enjoy the participation experience itself, which may depend on the 
composition of the program. Second, the eﬀects depend on the degree of familiarization 
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 with the services provided by the employment oﬃce and with the baseline expectations 
about the extent to which the state is perceived as a helpful or as a threatening institution. 
Some types of migrants may not be aware of the existence of a program at all. Finally, 
the magnitude of the ex ante eﬀect depends on the magnitude of the ex post eﬀect, so 
diﬀerences in ex ante eﬀects between diﬀerent types of unemployed may be due to diﬀer­
ences in ex post eﬀects. Notice that we do not aim to distinguish formally between these 
possible explanations. The latter primarily serves as a motivation for why diﬀerences may 
exist. In order to put the results into perspective, we also examine whether natives and 
migrants have the same job search strategies in terms of search eﬀort and reservation wage 
values. Any diﬀerences in the ex ante eﬀects between the diﬀerent types of unemployed 
could help to ﬁne tune the allocation of ALMP and, thus, could help reduce the labor 
market disadvantages of migrants. 
Some bodies of empirical work are relevant for the present study. Evaluation studies of 
ex post eﬀects by migrant status provide heterogeneous results. ALMP are partly success­
ful and partly ineﬀective. In rare cases they even seem to be harmful ex post. However, an 
important lesson from these studies is that migrants are often aﬀected diﬀerently by ALMP 
compared to natives, giving additional emphasis to the importance of our approach to in­
vestigate the ex ante eﬀects of ALMP separately. German studies that distinguish between 
natives and migrants mainly focus on welfare recipients. Huber et al. (2009) evaluate three 
diﬀerent types of welfare to work programs and ﬁnd positive eﬀects of these programs for 
natives but not for migrants. Aldashev et al. (2010) evaluate short-term training schemes. 
They estimate positive eﬀects for aptitude tests that are larger for migrants than for na­
tives, and positive eﬀects for short-term skill provision that are especially large for female 
immigrants. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd that job search training is generally ineﬀective and even 
has a negative eﬀect for female immigrants. Caliendo and K¨ unn (2011) analyze the eﬀects 
of start-up subsidies for the unemployed and show that both natives and migrants beneﬁt 
from participation. However, they ﬁnd higher eﬀects for natives in terms of employment 
probabilities and income. 
There are very few studies on ex ante eﬀects, and they only consider averages of treated 
individuals rather than speciﬁc subgroups like migrants. Black et al. (2003) use locally ran­
domized assignment of treatment status to examine empirically whether this aﬀects the 
voluntary inﬂow into unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts. Here, the treatment regime 
starts right after entering the UI regime. Abbring and Van den Berg (2005) show that 
if the moment of treatment has a random element, if the observed treatment and labor 
market outcomes are duration variables, and if there is randomized variation in the treat­
ment intensity, then identiﬁcation of ex ante eﬀects still requires a semi-parametric model 
structure and absence of anticipation of the moment of treatment (that is, no anticipation 
beyond what is captured in the treatment assignment equation; see Rosholm and Svarer, 
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 2008, for an application). De Giorgi (2005) and Van den Berg, Bozio and Costa Dias (2008) 
use a policy discontinuity in time to study the eﬀect of a treatment at a six-month unem­
ployment duration on the probability of ﬁnding work before six months. Speciﬁcally, they 
compare a situation where individuals in the inﬂow are aware of the policy to a situation 
where the policy regime has not yet been introduced. Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller 
(2005) observe whether and when unemployed individuals receive advance warnings about 
the timing of future treatments. By viewing such warnings as treatments themselves, they 
can apply the semi-parametric timing-of-events framework of Abbring and Van den Berg 
(2003) to study their eﬀect. 
Our approach builds on the study by Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo (2009) 
that develops and applies a novel general method to identify ex ante eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, 
they identify ex ante eﬀects of the comprehensive German package of active labor market 
policy by using self-reported variables of unemployed workers in a panel survey. The unem­
ployed are asked about their perceived probability of being treated in future periods, and 
they are also asked about their current optimal job search strategy, notably their current 
reservation wage and their current search eﬀort. All things equal, the expectation of a 
future event that changes the individual’s expected present value should have an eﬀect on 
the reservation wage or, in general, change the current search eﬀort. They ﬁnd that the ex 
ante eﬀect on the reservation wage and search eﬀort are negative and positive, respectively. 
This means that individuals try to prevent program participation by accepting worse jobs 
and searching harder than they would do if the programs were absent. They conjecture that 
this is due to a large extent to individuals disliking the actual participation experience. 
Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo (2009) use information from the ﬁrst survey 
wave of the IZA Evaluation Data Set (see Caliendo et al., 2011, for details). This is an ongo­
ing data collection process in which an inﬂow sample of unemployed in Germany is followed 
over time. They use information from the ﬁrst survey wave. The survey interviews were 
held in late 2007 and early 2008 with individuals who had recently become unemployed. 
Respondents answered an extensive set of questions inter alia about their search behav­
ior, reservation wages, previous employment experience, and expectations about program 
participation. 
Similar to Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo (2009), we use the ﬁrst wave of 
the IZA Evaluation Data Set. To some extent we use matching in order to estimate the 
eﬀect of diﬀerent participation expectations on the reservation wage and the search eﬀort. 
The matching approach is well-suited to dealing with individual heterogeneity. The data 
contain a number of self-reported personality and behavioral assessments and individual 
past labor market outcomes, which allow for a rich set of conditioning variables in the 
matching procedure. However, migrants with speciﬁc countries of origin constitute small 
subsamples of the full sample, which is why we frequently resort to regression methods. 
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 The paper has the following structure. Section 2 introduces the job search model on
 
which we build our empirical approach. This model allows individuals to receive utility or 
disutility from participation in ALMP for reasons other than their eﬀect on labor market 
outcomes. The data source, the variables used and the deﬁnition of migrants are described 
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation results and Section 5 concludes. 
2  The job search model 
This section summarizes the job search model developed in Van den Berg, Bergemann and 
Caliendo (2009). In this model the unemployed search sequentially for a job. For a given 
level of search eﬀort s, job oﬀers arrive at a certain rate λs. Oﬀers are random drawings 
from a wage oﬀer distribution F (w). If an oﬀer arrives, the individual must decide whether 
to accept the wage oﬀer (and keep it forever) or reject it and continue searching at least 
until the next oﬀer arrives. The individual receives beneﬁts b while unemployed and incurs 
search costs c(s), which depend on the search eﬀort level. The aim of the individual is 
to maximize the expected present value of income or utility over an inﬁnite horizon. The 
optimal search strategy can then be described by the reservation wage φ, giving the minimal 
acceptable wage oﬀer and an optimal level of search eﬀort s. 
Program participation is then introduced into this basic job search model.1 An individ­
ual that has not been treated enters at a speciﬁc rate η ≥ 0 into treatment. What actually 
matters is the perception of individuals about this entrance rate. For convenience, how­
ever, we do not distinguish in the text between the perceived rate and the actual treatment 
rate. Treatment can have an eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate parameter λ and/or the wage 
oﬀer distribution F (w) and the individual is aware of these eﬀects. Concerning treatment, 
however, the individual does not know the exact moment of treatment, only the rate at 
which it occurs. 
The  expected  present  value  without  treatment  is  R.  With  treatment,  the  expected 
present  value  changes  to  Rp.  The  total  gain  G  due  to  treatment  can  be  described  by 
G  =  Rp − R − γ,  where  γ  captures  the  direct  costs  of  treatment.  These  costs  can  be 
positive or negative, depending on whether the individual dislikes or likes the treatment. 
Similarly, the treatment eﬀect Rp − R due to changes in the labor market position can also 
be positive or negative. 
In this new setting the reservation wage φ and the optimal search eﬀort level s depend 
on the total gains G of the treatment and on the rate η at which the treatment occurs. 
In order to make this explicit, we write φ(η, G) and s(η, G). Ex ante eﬀects can then be 
described by the diﬀerence in the reservation wage φ and the optimal search eﬀort level 
1The main insights are robust with respect to the model assumptions; see the discussion in Van den 
Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo (2009). 
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 s that arise if we compare a world without treatment, (η = 0 and G = 0) with a world 
with treatment (η = η0  and parameter values λp  and Fp  leading to G = G0), i.e. by the 
diﬀerence φ(η0,G0) − φ(0, 0) and s(η0,G0) − s(0, 0). 
Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo (2009) show that if the total gain is positive 
and treatment occurs with a positive rate (G > 0 and η > 0), then the ex ante eﬀect on 
the reservation wage φ is positive, whilst the eﬀect on the optimal search eﬀort level s is 
negative. As a results, individuals become more choosy and search less extensively. Both 
eﬀects reduce the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Similarly, if the gains 
become negative (G < 0) and the treatment rate is positive (η > 0), then the eﬀect on the 
reservation wage will be negative (φ(η0,G0) − φ(0, 0) < 0) and on the search eﬀort level 
positive (s(η0,G0) − s(0, 0) > 0). Consequently, if we compare the reservation wage (search 
eﬀort level) of similar individuals, where one group report a certain value η > 0 with the 
reservation wage (search eﬀort level) of another group that report a value of η = 0, one is 
able to draw conclusion on the sign of the total gain of treatment G. Thus, the empirical 
signs of dφ/dη and ds/dη can be used to infer whether G � 0. If the empirical signs of 
dφ/dη and ds/dη are zero then there are no ex ante eﬀects, and it can be concluded that 
G = 0, so either the program is ineﬀective, or the program is beneﬁcial but the individual 
dislikes the treatment itself. 
The ex ante eﬀects may be heterogeneous. The extent to which the treatment entry rate 
inﬂuences the optimal job search strategy reﬂects the eﬀect of treatment on the expected 
present  value.  Simultaneously,  model  determinants  that  lead  to  a  high  rate  of  moving 
from unemployment to employment reduce the ex ante eﬀects. Formally, the derivatives 
dφ/dη  and  ds/dη  depend  on  all  the  other  model  determinants,  which  means  that  the 
eﬀect of the treatment entry rate η on the reservation wage φ and on the optimal search 
eﬀort  level  s  interacts  with  all  other  model  determinants,  leading  to  heterogeneous  ex 
ante eﬀects. Consequently, the matching method is particularly well-suited to determining 
ex ante eﬀects, as it allows for eﬀect heterogeneity. Moreover, matching does not impose 
functional form restrictions and it is explicitly clear about the weighting procedure used to 
estimate average treatment eﬀects (see also Section 4). However, adequate application of 
matching requires a suﬃciently large sample size. Migrants of speciﬁc origins may constitute 
small samples, so we frequently resort to regression methods where we estimate interaction 
eﬀects to capture eﬀect heterogeneity. 
3  Data 
In the empirical analysis we estimate ex ante eﬀects for recently unemployed workers of the 
comprehensive German package of active labor market policies, for both native Germans 
and migrants separately. The most prominent ALMP in Germany are short training pro­
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 grams and job search assistance schemes. However, start-up subsidies for the unemployed, 
job creation programs, long-term (re-)training programs and wage subsidies for jobs in the 
private sector are of quite considerable size as well (see Eichhorst and Zimmermann, 2007, 
or Bernhard et al., 2008, for recent overviews). In Germany, as in other European countries, 
case workers have a large inﬂuence on the (timing of the) participation of an unemployed 
worker in ALMP. Recently unemployed individuals are typically assigned to job search as­
sistance programs or training programs. Long-term unemployed individuals are more often 
assigned to employment programs, consisting of either wage subsidy programs for jobs in 
the private sector or job creation schemes. 
The data we use are from the IZA Evaluation Data Set. As explained in Section 1, 
this survey data set targets an inﬂow sample into unemployment from June 2007 to May 
2008. The key feature of the data set is that individuals are interviewed shortly after they 
become unemployed and are asked a variety of non-standard questions about attitudes and 
expectations (see Caliendo et al., 2011, for details). The sampling is restricted to individ­
uals who are 16 to 54 years old and who receive or are eligible to receive unemployment 
beneﬁts under the German Social Code III. From the monthly unemployment inﬂows of 
approximately 206,000 individuals in the administrative records2, a 9% random sample is 
drawn which constitutes the gross sample. Out of this gross sample representative samples 
of approximately 1,450 individuals are interviewed each month, so that after one year 12 
monthly cohorts are gathered. 
For the ﬁrst wave 17,396 interviews were conducted and individuals were interviewed 
about two months after becoming unemployed. We restrict our analysis to individuals who 
are still unemployed and are actively searching for a job. That is, we exclude individuals 
who have already found a job, are participating in a program or are not searching for 
other reasons.3  This leaves us with a preliminary sample of 8,612 individuals, from which 
we further exclude the lowest and highest percentile of the reported hourly reservation 
wage and the reported beneﬁt level as well as individuals with missing values for any key 
variables. The ﬁnal results is a sample of 7,913 individuals. 
Throughout  the  paper  we  use  a  broad  deﬁnition  for  migrants  and  individuals  with 
migration background (called migrants henceforth). We deﬁne an individual as a migrant 
if the individual is either born abroad, or not in possession of a German passport, or with 
either a father or a mother who was born abroad. With this deﬁnition we basically cover 
ﬁrst and second generation migrants. As migrants themselves cannot be expected to be a 
homogenous group with respect to their labor market behavior, we diﬀerentiate between 
2Administrative records are based on the “Integrated Labour Market Biographies” of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB), containing relevant register data from four sources: employment history, 
unemployment support recipience, participation in active labor market programs, and job seeker history. 
3Of these three categories, program participation is by far the smallest. 
7
 major immigration groups. We distinguish between individuals originating from Central 
and Eastern Europe/former Yugoslavia, Russia and Turkey. We compare the results found 
for these migration groups with those of the native Germans. Note that although Germany 
in the 1960s also experienced a major inﬂow of Italians, our sample of Italians is too small 
to consider them a separate group. Instead, we remove the migrants from the other parts 
of Europe, America, Africa and Asia from our data, and the resulting sample consists of 
7,147 individuals. 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics. Migrants are on average either younger or 
have the same age as natives (30 to 36 years vs. 36 years). Russians and migrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe/former Yugoslavia have been staying on average longer in 
Germany than migrants from Turkey (12 to 13 years vs. 10 years). Migrants tend to live 
predominantly in West Germany (84%-93% vs. 63%), are more often married (47%-54% 
vs. 38%) and have more children than natives (35%-51% vs. 31% have children, 0.51-0.89 
vs. 0.48 on average). In addition, the share of unemployment beneﬁt recipients among the 
group of migrants is lower than among the group of native Germans (73%-77% vs. 79%). 
The educational background of migrants varies a lot. Compared to 25% of native Germans, 
who have a high school degree, 32% of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe/former 
Yugoslavia also have one, whereas this is true of only 17% of Turkish and 18% of Rus­
sian migrants. Similarly, the previous labor market history in the group of migrants is 
very diverse. Individuals from Central and Eastern Europe/former Yugoslavia and Rus­
sia experience fewer months of unemployment (measured relative to the years since the 
18th birthday) than natives (0.65-0.71 vs. 0.83 months), whereas migrants with a Turkish 
background are more often unemployed than natives (0.89 months). At the same time, 
however, all migrant groups had fewer previous employment months than natives (again 
measured relative to the years since the 18th birthday, 6.12-7.89 vs. 8.45 months). It is sur­
prising that Russians and the Central and Eastern Europeans/former Yugoslavians have 
simultaneously shorter unemployment and employment spells, even when age is controlled 
for. One reason could be that this group of migrants spends more time in education and 
military service. 
Individuals are also asked questions regarding their “locus of control”, which is a gen­
eralized expectancy about internal versus external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966). 
Whereas individuals whose external locus of control personality trait dominates believe 
that everything that happens is beyond their control, people with an internal locus of con­
trol are conﬁdent that outcomes are contingent on their decisions and behavior.4  Natives 
4Locus of control is measured by a set of statements to which individuals could reply on a scale of “1” 
(I do not agree at all) to “7” (I agree fully), e.g., “How my life takes course is entirely dependent on me” 
or “Success is gained through hard work”. We sum up the positive answers and build a single dummy 
variable if the answers exceed a certain threshold. 
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 do report an average of 5.04 with respect to their locus of control, whereas it is lower for 
Russians (4.87) and people from Central Eastern Europe/former Yugoslavia (4.95) and 
Turkey (4.81). 
The key variable for our analysis, the entry rate into treatment η, is measured by the 
answer to the question how likely it is that ALMP participation occurs conditional on re­
maining unemployed in the next three months. This explicitly merges all ALMP measures 
(the main ALMP for short-term unemployed workers are training, job search assistance, 
and subsidized work). The answers range from 0 (“very unlikely”) to 10 (“very likely”). 
For the analysis we construct a binary measure by grouping 0−4 into the category “η-low” 
and 5 − 10 into “η-high”. The search eﬀort s is operationalized as the number of search 
channels used where the maximum number is 10.5  This is in line with e.g. Van den Berg 
and Van der Klaauw (2006) and references therein who also use this outcome as an indica­
tor of search eﬀort. On average, 57% of native Germans ﬁnd it highly likely to participate 
in a program of ALMP (see Table 2). The probability is higher for migrants. Note that the 
Turkish most often report that it is likely they will participate in an ALMP (69%), whereas 
Russians (63%) and unemployed migrants from Central and Eastern Europe/former Yu­
goslavia (61%) are more similar to natives in that respect. Major diﬀerences in the average 
values of the variables describing the search strategies only exist between the native Ger­
mans and the migrants with a Turkish background. The average reservation wage and the 
average number of search channels of native Germans are e6.89/hour and 5.12 channels, 
whereas Turkish migrants have on average a higher reservation wage (e7.35) and a smaller 
number of search channels (4.75), despite the fact that they are, for example, less educated 
than the average native German. Russians and Central and Eastern Europeans/former 
Yugoslavians have an average reservation wage of e6.72 Euro and e7.02 respectively, and 
use on average 4.92 and 5.23 search channels. 
4  Empirical Analysis 
As a ﬁrst step we conduct a simple regression analysis of the logarithm of the reserva­
tion wage (log φ) and the number of search channels (s) on the expected participation 
probability  η.  We  include  a  large  set  of  additional  explanatory  variables,  for  example, 
5Individuals were asked the following questions, where multiple entries were allowed: “What have you 
done in order to ﬁnd an apprenticeship or employment? Have you searched... 1: through job advertisements 
in  the  newspaper,  2:  by  personally  advertising  as  a  job  seeker,  3:  through  a  job  information  system, 
4: through contact with acquaintances,  relatives,  other private contacts, 5: through an agent from the 
employment  agency,  6:  through  internet  research,  7:  through  a  private  agent  with  agency  voucher,  8: 
through a private agent without agency voucher, 9: through blind application at companies 10: other, 11: 
nothing of its kind.” We take the sum of all answers as the number of search channels. 
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 years since migration as a percentage of age, individual past labor market history, bene­
ﬁt level, education, regional indicators, marital status, number of children, age, means of 
communications, and month of entry in unemployment. For second-generation immigrants, 
years since migration is set to zero, as for natives. Additionally we control for personality 
traits such as locus of control, openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism 
which have proven to be important in recent labor market research (see e.g. Borghans, 
Duckworth, Heckman, and Ter Weel, 2008). We pool all individuals independently of their 
origin. However, we introduce dummy variables for the diﬀerent migration groups as well 
as interaction terms that combine the migration background and η in order to accomplish 
our goal to investigate whether there are diﬀerences in search strategies and diﬀerences in 
the ex-ante eﬀects. 
The regression results on the determinants of the reservation wage in Table 3 conﬁrm 
the descriptive results that Turkish migrants have a higher reservation wage than all other 
groups. The dummy on Turkish origin is positive and highly signiﬁcant (10%). Furthermore, 
the results suggest that native Germans reduce their reservation wage in case they belong to 
the “η–high” category by 2.8%. The coeﬃcients on the other interaction terms are slightly 
larger, however, not signiﬁcant. 
With respect to search channels we ﬁnd some diﬀerences between the diﬀerent groups 
of  origins.  Russians  seem  to  have  a  somewhat  lower  search  eﬀort  level  than  the  other 
groups (the coeﬃcient on Russians is negative, but only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.) Most 
importantly for our analysis of the ex-ante eﬀects, the OLS estimates suggest that native 
Germans, Central and Eastern Europeans/former Yugoslavians and Russians signiﬁcantly 
increase their search eﬀort when they expect to participate in an ALMP. Only individuals 
with a Turkish background  do not change their search eﬀort  level in response to their 
expected extent of participation in ALMP. This is in contrast to all other groups considered 
here. We conclude that the Turkish migrants are quite diﬀerent in this respect from natives 
and the two other migration groups (Central and Eastern Europeans/former Yugoslavians 
and Russians). Notice that years since migration does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. One 
explanation for this is that this variable contrasts second-generation immigrants and natives 
on the one side to ﬁrst-generation migrants on the other side. We return to this in the 
concluding section of the paper. 
As a next step, we proceed by using propensity score matching (introduced by Rosen­
baum and Rubin, 1983; see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008, 
and Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009, for recent overviews) in order to estimate the average 
“treatment–on–the–treated” eﬀect (ATET), where of course in our case the “treatment” is 
the entry rate into ALMP participation. As we need a reasonable sample size for matching, 
we merge Central and Eastern Europeans/former Yugoslavians and Russians, and call this 
group henceforth CEER. Despite matching being able to handle heterogeneity of treatment 
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 eﬀects, we omit Turkish migrants, as they seem to react so very diﬀerently.6 Note that the 
treatment consists in being in the “η–high” group as compared to being in the “η–low” 
group. Thus, we regard a high subjective probability of participating in an ALMP condi­
tional on staying unemployed as the treatment. After estimating the propensity score for 
the probability of being in the “η–high” category (we use the same rich set of conditioning 
variables as in the OLS regressions, see Table 4 for the score estimates and Figure 1 for 
the score distribution), we perform Kernel-matching7  in order to obtain ATET estimates. 
The estimation procedure is conducted separately for migrants and natives. In addition, 
we also want to investigate whether there are diﬀerences in the search behavior between 
natives and migrants, conditional on them being in a certain “η” category. In this case 
we interpret being a migrant as a treatment vs. being a native German. One can think of 
this approach as a thought experiment which answers the question: What would happen 
to the reservation wage and the search intensity of a native German with the average char­
acteristics of a migrant and who would become a migrant. Here, we omit the ”years since 
migration” as it would be heavily related to the outcome measure. 
Let us turn to the estimation results for the matching analyses. For both native Germans 
and  CEER,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  ex  ante  eﬀects  on  the  reservation  wage  are  negative  and 
on  the  search  eﬀort  are  positive,  respectively  (see  Table  5).  Having  the  perspective  of 
otherwise going into a program of ALMP, native Germans and CEER migrants are willing 
to accept worse jobs by lowering their reservation wage. Natives with a high η lower their 
reservation wage by 3.0% and CEER migrants by 3.9%, but the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant 
at conventional levels (p-value: 0.12). Both migrants and natives with a high η also search 
signiﬁcantly harder, and the eﬀect is larger for migrants (0.46 or 9% more channels) than 
natives (0.22 or 4.3% more channels). This shows that both migrants and natives with high 
η actively try to prevent participation. 
We now address the question whether there are diﬀerences between migrants and native 
Germans within the “η–low” or “η–high” group, respectively. The estimates of ATET are 
also presented in Table 5, in which we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the “η–low” 
groups. This means that migrants from CEER who are part of the “ η-low” group have 
the same average reservation wage and average search eﬀort as similar native Germans. 
Furthermore, we are not able to ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the average reservation wages 
for the “η–high” groups. However, we do ﬁnd that CEER migrants increase the search eﬀort 
level even more than similar native Germans in view of a likely participation in ALMP. 
6Indeed, when including Turkish migrants the results seem to be partly driven by their inclusion. At 
the same time the group of Turkish migrants is too small in order to use matching for them alone. Due to 
insuﬃcient overlap we would need to discard 7% of all “treated”. 
7For the kernel matching procedure, we use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06 and 
impose the common support condition based on the “MinMax” criterion. 
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 Thus,  CEER  migrants  try  to  prevent  participation  in  ALMP  even  harder  than  native
 
Germans by searching more intensively. 
Both sets of matching results are in full agreement with the OLS results. With this in 
mind, we may return to the OLS estimates for Turkish migrants. Those results suggest 
that Turkish migrants try to prevent participation by reducing the reservation wage by a 
similar amount to native Germans. However, note that the initial level of the reservation 
wage of Turkish migrants is higher than the one of similar natives. At the same time, 
Turkish migrants do not show signs of adjustment in their search eﬀort. From this we 
conclude that migrants with a Turkish background struggle less than native Germans and 
CEER migrants to prevent participation in ALMP.8 
In  addition,  we  conduct  a  separate  matching  analysis  for  Russians  and  for  Central 
and Eastern Europeans/former Yugoslavians. As the OLS results already indicate, we ﬁnd 
some diﬀerences between these two groups with regard to the search eﬀort level. However, 
further research is required to investigate any diﬀerences between these groups because the 
current sample precludes an in-depth investigation; whereas with additional waves of the 
panel, we will be able to take advantage of multiple observations per individual and exploit 
the information in realized outcomes. 
The analysis naturally raises the question where the diﬀerences between native Germans 
and migrants  might originate  from,  and why there  are  diﬀerences between migrants  of 
diﬀerent origins. 
One potential explanation could be that individuals of diﬀerent origins interpret ques­
tions  in  the  interview  in  diﬀerent  ways.  In  one  sense,  we  can  rule  out  this  possibility, 
because in many cases native speakers were used when interviewing migrants. In partic­
ular, Turkish speakers were used to interview Turkish respondents, and Russian speakers 
were used for respondents who were ﬂuent in Russian but not in German. What we cannot 
rule out is that respondents from certain regions of origin have diﬃculties with the concept 
of a reservation wage as such because they expect to be able to bargain over the wage 
and other job characteristics. Another potential explanation is that the groups diﬀer with 
respect to the type of jobs they expect and that the diﬀerences in reservation wage reﬂect 
compensating wage diﬀerentials. However, these explanations only explain diﬀerent levels 
of the reservation wage. As a ﬁrst-order approximation, it should not be able to explain 
diﬀerences in ex-ante eﬀects. 
Yet another potential explanation for the diﬀerences in the ex ante eﬀects is that in­
dividuals of diﬀerent origins have diﬀerent degrees of awareness of the program (see De 
Graaf-Zijl, Van den Berg and Heyma, 2011). However, in our data only very few migrants 
(and native Germans) reported not to know about ALMP programs. Therefore, we can 
reject this possibility as well. 
8The matching estimates for Turkish, although based on very few observations, support these results. 
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 If diﬀerences in the information sets are excluded, then, according to the theoretical 
model (see Section 2), the diﬀerences in the ex ante eﬀects either derive from diﬀerences in 
the ex post treatment eﬀects due to changes in the labor market position or from diﬀerences 
in direct costs of treatment. At the current state of research, we can only speculate which 
of  these  aspects  might  play  a  role  here.  The  evidence  on  ex–post  treatment  eﬀects  is 
insuﬃcient in order to state with some certainty that they are (partly) responsible for the 
heterogeneity in the ex ante eﬀects; but naturally they remain a potential candidate for 
the explanation. 
One  could,  however,  also  suspect  that  the  direct  costs  of  treatment  diﬀer  between 
the diﬀerent nationalities. For example, the higher search intensity of CEER migrants to 
prevent participation could originate from a stronger dislike of governmental intervention 
compared to native Germans and Turkish individuals or from the special involvement of 
case workers, which makes search cheaper. 
In contrast to natives and, even more so, in contrast to CEER migrants, Turkish in­
dividuals do not increase their search intensity if they face participation in ALMP. They 
either beneﬁt more from participation in ALMP or their direct costs of participation are 
lower. One supporting aspect why the direct costs of participation could be responsible is 
related to the higher reservation wages of Turkish individuals compared to other nation­
alities. The higher reservation wage could reﬂect that Turkish have a lower nonpecuniary 
disutility of unemployment (probably due to neighborhood eﬀects of living close to other 
unemployed individuals). This lower nonpecuniary disutility of unemployment could also 
transfer to lower costs of participation in ALMP. 
5  Conclusions 
Using a recently developed method to determine ex ante eﬀects of participation in ALMP, 
this paper uncovers the heterogeneity of these eﬀects according to migrant status in Ger­
many. We ﬁnd that the search behavior of Turkish migrants is not aﬀected by the probabil­
ity of future participation in ALMP. There is a moderate threat eﬀect for native Germans, 
while individuals from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and former Yugoslavia increase 
their job search behavior most in order to prevent participation. We speculate that next 
to diﬀerences in the ex post treatment eﬀect, the diﬀerences in ex ante eﬀects may be 
driven by diﬀerences in the direct cost  of treatment,  perhaps  derived from a dislike of 
governmental intervention (for the Central and Eastern Europeans, Russians and former 
Yugoslavians) and lower disutility of staying unemployed and participating in a program 
(Turkish migrants). 
Note that prevention of participation is not per se in the interest of society. In order to 
return to work fast, individuals might accept jobs in which their productivity is not fully 
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 exploited. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate further the sources of the heterogeneity
 
and to examine realized post-unemployment outcomes. The results of our study suggest 
that an important group for this consists of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and former Yugoslavia, as this group shows the strongest dislike for ALMP. 
Another interesting topic for further research would be to explore diﬀerences between 
ﬁrst- and second generation migrants. Recent work by Constant et al. (2010a,b) provides 
evidence that ﬁrst- and second-generation migrants diﬀer in terms of attitudes towards risk, 
language skills, and reservation wages. From this one may expect diﬀerences in the response 
to a high perceived probability of ALMP participation as well. Presumably, our explanatory 
variable capturing years since migration is not able to capture any such generation-speciﬁc 
diﬀerences. Moreover, stratifying by generation as well as by region of origin would result 
in subsamples that are too small to allow for meaningful inference. One would therefore 
like to have access to a larger sample of migrants from a speciﬁc region of origin. Moreover, 
following Constant et al. (2010a), one may extend the theoretical job-search framework by 




Abbring, J.H. and G.J. van den Berg (2003), “The non-parametric identiﬁcation of treat­
ment eﬀects in duration models”, Econometrica, 71(5), 1491–1517. 
Abbring, J.H. and G.J. van den Berg (2005), “Social experiments and instrumental vari­
ables with duration outcomes”, Working paper 2005:11, IFAU, Uppsala. 
Aldashev, A., S.L. Thomsen, and T. Walter (2010), “Short-term training programs for 
immigrants: Do eﬀects diﬀer from natives and why?”, Discussion paper 10–021, ZEW, 
Mannheim. 
Algan, Y., C. Dustmann, A. Glitz, and A. Manning (2010), “The economic situation of 
ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom”, 
Economic Journal, 120(542), F4–F30. 
Bernhard, S., K. Hohmeyer, E. Jozwiak, S. Koch, T. Kruppe, G. Stephan and J. Wolﬀ 
(2008),  “Aktive  Arbeitsmarktpolitik  in  Deutschland  und  ihre  Wirkungen”,  Research 
report 2/2008, IAB, Nuremberg. 
Black, D.A., J.A. Smith, M.C. Berger, and B.J. Noel (2003), “Is the threat of reemployment 
services more eﬀective than the services themselves? Evidence from random assignment 
in the UI system”, American Economic Review, 93(4), 1313–1327. 
Blundell, R. and M. Costa Dias (2009), “Alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical 
microeconomics”, Journal of Human Resources, 44(3), 565–640. 
Borghans, L., A.L. Duckworth, J.J. Heckman, and B. ter Weel (2008), “The Economics 
and Psychology of Personality Traits”, Journal of Human Resources, 43(4), 972–1059. 
Caliendo, M., A. Falk, L. Kaiser, H. Schneider, A. Uhlendorﬀ, G.J. van den Berg, and K.F. 
Zimmermann (2011), “The IZA Evaluation Data Set: Towards evidence-based labour 
policy-making”, International Journal of Manpower, forthcoming. 
Caliendo, M., and S. Kopeinig (2008), “Some practical guidance for the implementation 
of propensity score matching”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(1), 31–72. 
Caliendo, M., and S. K¨ unn (2011), “Start-Up Subsidies for the Unemployed: Long-Term 
Evidence and Eﬀect Heterogeneity”, Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming. 
Constant, A.F., A. Krause, U. Rinne and K.F. Zimmermann (2010a), “Economic Prefer­
ences and Attitudes of the Unemployed: Are Natives and Second Generation Migrants 
Alike?”, Working paper, IZA, Bonn. 
Constant, A.F., A. Krause, U. Rinne and K.F. Zimmermann (2010b), “Reservation Wages 
of First and Second Generation Migrants”, Working paper, IZA, Bonn. 
15
 De  Graaf-Zijl,  M.,  G.J.  van  den  Berg,  G.,  A.  Heyma  (2011),  “Stepping  stones  for  the
 
unemployed: the eﬀect of temporary jobs on the duration until (regular) work”, Journal 
of Population Economics, 24, 107–139. 
De Giorgi, G. (2005), “Long term eﬀects of a mandatory multistage program: The New 
Deal for Young People in the UK”, Working paper 05/08, UCL, London. 
Eichhorst, W. and K.F. Zimmermann (2007), “And Then There Were Four...How Many 
(and  Which)  Measures  of  Active  Labor  Market  Policy  Do  We  Still  Need?”,  Applied 
Economics Quarterly, 53(3), 243–272. 
Huber, M., M. Lechner, C. Wunsch, and T. Walter (2009), “Do German welfare-to-work 
programmes reduce welfare and increase work?”, Discussion Paper 4090, IZA, Bonn. 
Imbens, G.W. and J.M. Wooldridge (2009), “Recent developments in the econometrics of 
program evaluation”, Journal of Economic Literature, 47(1), 5–86. 
Lalive, R., J.C. van Ours, and J. Zweim¨ uller (2005), “The eﬀect of beneﬁt sanctions on 
the duration of unemployment”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(6), 
1386–1417. 
OECD (2010), International Migration Outlook 2010, OECD, Paris. 
Rosenbaum,  P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1983):  “The central role  of the propensity score  in 
observational studies for causal eﬀects”, Biometrika, 70(1), 41–55. 
Rosholm,  M.  and  M.  Svarer  (2008),  “The  threat  eﬀect  of  active  labour  market  pro­
grammes”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 385–401 
Rotter, J.B. (1966), Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of rein­
forcement, American Psychological Association, Washington DC. 
Van den Berg, G.J. and B. van der Klaauw (2006), “Counseling and monitoring of unem­
ployed workers: Theory and evidence from a controlled social experiment”, International 
Economic Review, 47(3), 895–936. 
Van den Berg, G.J., A. Bergemann, and M. Caliendo (2009), “The eﬀect of active labor 
market programs on not-yet treated unemployed individuals”, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 7(2-3), 606–616. 
Van den Berg, G.J., A. Bozio and M. Costa Dias (2008), “Policy discontinuity and duration 
outcomes”, Working paper, VU University Amsterdam. 
16
 Table 1: Selected Sample Descriptives: Baseline Characteristics for Natives 
and Migrants 
Variables  Native  Russian  Central & Eastern  Turkish 
European/ 
Yugoslavian 
N  6181  325  432  209 
West Germany  0.63  0.93  0.84  0.93 
Female  0.50  0.51  0.58  0.46 
German citizenship  1.00  0.93  0.74  0.50 
Years since migration  0.00  12.99  12.36  9.96 
Age  35.95  32.05  36.09  30.33 
Age (17-24 years)  0.22  0.36  0.17  0.29 
Age (25-34 years)  0.25  0.29  0.33  0.45 
Age (35-44 years)  0.28  0.20  0.26  0.20 
Age (45-55 years)  0.26  0.15  0.24  0.06 
Married (or cohabiting)  0.38  0.54  0.48  0.47 
Number of children  0.48  0.73  0.51  0.89 
Children 
No children  0.69  0.56  0.65  0.49 
One child  0.18  0.24  0.21  0.23 
Two (or more) children  0.13  0.20  0.13  0.28 
Locus of Control (1=external, 7=internal)  5.04  4.87  4.95  4.81 
Unemployment beneﬁt recipient (1=yes)  0.79  0.73  0.76  0.77 
Level of UB (missings=0)  510.84  424.39  503.87  478.29 
Level of UB (log(ben+1),mis=0)  4.73  4.34  4.61  4.67 
School leaving degree 
None, special needs, other  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.12 
Lower secondary school  0.29  0.34  0.31  0.43 
Middle secondary school  0.44  0.45  0.33  0.28 
Specialized upper secondary school  0.25  0.18  0.32  0.17 
Professional Qualiﬁcation 
None  0.08  0.18  0.14  0.32 
Internal or external professional training  0.73  0.65  0.65  0.54 
Technical college or university degree  0.19  0.17  0.21  0.14 
Months in unemployment (div. by age-18)  0.83  0.65  0.71  0.89 
Months in employment (div. by age-18)  8.45  6.14  7.89  7.81 
Employment status before unemployment 
Employed  0.65  0.59  0.69  0.66 
Subsidized employment  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.05 
School, apprentice, military, etc.  0.15  0.19  0.10  0.14 
Maternity leave  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06 
Other  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09 
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations. 
Note: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise. 
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 Table 2: Perceived Treatment Entry and Search Intensity of Natives and 
Migrants 
Variables  Native  Russian  Central & Eastern  Turkish 
European/ 
Yugoslavian 
N  6181  325  432  209 
Subjective  (overall)  probability  of  treatment  4.80  5.24  5.13  5.72 
participation (0=very low, 10=very high) 
(3.58)  (3.45)  (3.54)  (3.39) 
Participation probability (η ≥ 5)  0.57  0.63  0.61  0.69 
Reservation wage (in euros)  6.89  6.72  7.02  7.35 
(2.32)  (2.04)  (2.25)  (2.09) 
Number of search channels  5.12  4.92  5.23  4.75 
(1.67)  (1.61)  (1.67)  (1.65) 
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
 
Note: All numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; standard deviations in parentheses.
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 Table 3: OLS Estimation Results - Reservation Wage and Number of Search Channels
 
log φ s 
Migration background (Ref.: Natives) 
Russians  0.004  -.310∗ 
Central & Eastern European, former YU.  -.002  -.021 
Turkish  0.1∗∗∗  -.158 
Migration background × participation probability 
Natives ×ηH  -.028∗∗∗  0.231∗∗∗ 
Russians ×ηH  -.039  0.505∗∗∗ 
Central & Eastern European, former YU. ×ηH  -.039  0.377∗∗ 
Turkish ×ηH  -.045  -.018 
West Germany  0.161∗∗∗  0.145∗∗∗ 
Years since migration (divided by age)  -.0002  0.135 
Female  -.123∗∗∗  0.019 
Married (or cohabiting)  -.007  0.139∗∗∗ 
Children (Ref.: No children) 
One child  0.025∗∗∗  -.040 
Two (or more) children  0.055∗∗∗  -.234∗∗∗ 
Unemployment beneﬁt recipient (1=yes)  -.037∗∗  0.033 
Level of unemployment beneﬁts (log(ben+1),mis=0)  0.01∗∗∗  0.028∗∗ 
Age (Ref.: 17-24 years) 
Age (25-34 years)  0.094∗∗∗  -.151∗∗ 
Age (35-44 years)  0.149∗∗∗  -.028 
Age (45-55 years)  0.153∗∗∗  -.074 
School leaving degree 
None, special needs, other (Ref.) 
Lower secondary school  0.064∗∗∗  0.019 
Middle secondary school  0.076∗∗∗  0.161 
Specialized upper secondary school  0.154∗∗∗  -.035 
Vocational training 
None (Ref.) 
Int. or ext. prof. training, others  0.067∗∗∗  0.18∗∗ 
Technical college or university degree  0.214∗∗∗  0.33∗∗∗ 
Months in unemployment (div. by age-18)  -.013∗∗∗  -.007 
Months in employment (div. by age-18)  0.001∗  0.006∗ 
Personality traits 
Locus of Control (1 = Internal)  0.027∗∗∗  -.097∗∗ 
Openness (standardized)  0.017∗∗∗  0.065∗∗∗ 
Conscientiousness (standardized)  -.002  0.102∗∗∗ 
Extraversion (standardized)  0.009∗∗  0.05∗∗ 
Neuroticism (standardized)  -.012∗∗∗  -.064∗∗∗ 
Father has A-level qualiﬁcations? 
Not known (ref.) 
Yes  0.04∗∗  0.136 
No  0.017  0.166∗ 
Father employed at age 15? 
Not known or already dead (ref.) 
Yes  -.008  -.090 
No  -.0009  0.021 
Employment status before Unemployment (Ref.: Employed) 
Subsidized employment  -.020  0.019 
School, apprentice, military, etc.  -.046∗∗∗  -.072 
Maternity leave  -.028∗  -.066 
Other  -.006  -.130∗ 
Available means of communication: 
Landline telephone  -.020∗  -.235∗∗∗ 
Personal mobile phone  0.022∗  0.077 
Computer  0.003  -.040 
Printer  -.008  0.27∗∗∗ 
Internet  0.033∗∗  0.155 
Email  0.029∗∗  0.232∗∗∗ 
Observations.  7,147  7,147 
Pseudo-R2  0.303  0.062 
Note: Additional control variables used in the estimation: Months of entry into unemployment (June 2007 - April 2008),
 




∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
 
19 Table 4: Propensity Score Estimation: General Participation Expectation in ALMP
 
CEER migr.:  Natives:  High η: CEER  Low η: CEER 
High vs. Low η  High vs. Low η  vs. Natives  vs. Natives 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
West Germany  -.186  0.297∗∗∗  1.277∗∗∗  1.728∗∗∗ 
Female  0.209  0.153∗∗∗  -.053  -.025 
Married (or cohabiting)  -.336∗  -.095  0.799∗∗∗  1.053∗∗∗ 
Children (Ref.: No children) 
One child  0.087  -.002  0.258∗  0.088 
Two (or more) children  -.026  0.12  0.078  0.032 
Years since migration (divided by age)  -.030 
Unemployment beneﬁt recipient (1=yes)  0.036  0.29∗∗  -.337  -.142 
Level of UB (log(ben+1),mis=0)  0.012  0.008  0.021  0.032 
Age (Ref.: 17-24 years) 
Age (25-34 years)  0.084  -.167∗  -.320∗∗  -.475∗∗ 
Age (35-44 years)  0.209  -.198∗∗  -.911∗∗∗  -1.158∗∗∗ 
Age (45-55 years)  -.2123  -.373∗∗∗  -1.066∗∗∗  -1.236∗∗∗ 
School leaving degree 
None, special needs, other (Ref.) 
Lower secondary school  -.346  -.101  -.147  -.305 
Middle secondary school  -.488  -.251  -.050  -.171 
Specialized upper secondary school  -.359  -.442∗∗  -.016  -.688 
Vocational training 
None (Ref.) 
Int. or ext. prof. training, others  -.346  0.023  -.624∗∗∗  -.204 
Technical college or university degree  -.488  -.347∗∗∗  -.423∗  -.157 
Months in unemployment (div. by age-18)  -.200∗∗∗  -.081∗∗∗  -.162∗∗∗  -.028 
Months in employment (div. by age-18)  -.0002  -.007  -.045∗∗∗  -.066∗∗∗ 
Personality traits 
Locus of Control (1=Internal)  -.212  0.004  -.201∗  -.075 
Openness (standardized)  -.102  0.053∗  -.250∗∗∗  -.094 
Conscientiousness (standardized)  -.076  0.019  0.001  0.093 
Extraversion (standardized)  0.105  -.015  0.009  -.093 
Neuroticism (standardized)  0.124  -.030  0.185∗∗∗  0.038 
Father has A-level qualiﬁcations? 
Not known (ref.) 
Yes  0.252  -.150  0.997∗∗∗  0.476 
No  0.057  -.033  0.199  -.017 
Father employed at age 15? 
Not known or already dead (ref.) 
Yes  -.101  0.071  -.286  0.016 
No  -.163  0.226  -.126  0.488 
Employment status before UE (Ref.: Employed) 
Subsidized employment  0.019  -.048  0.131  0.146 
School, apprentice, military, etc.  0.05  0.193∗∗  -.555∗∗∗  -.484∗ 
Maternity leave  -.017  0.085  -.570∗∗  -.442 
Other  -.123  -.110  -.192  -.148 
Rent  0.332∗  -.070  0.592∗∗∗  0.193 
Subletting  -.037  -.011  0.325  0.335 
Other  0.01  -.681∗  0.465  -.326 
Available communication (non-exclusive) 
Landline telephone  -.391  -.146  0.206  0.391 
Personal mobile phone  -.030  0.007  -.698∗∗∗  -.625∗∗∗ 
Computer  0.397  0.08  0.073  0.004 
Printer  0.062  -.098  -.277  -.428∗ 
Internet  -.138  0.104  0.246  0.311 
Email  -.045  -.068  -.498∗∗  -.427 
Observations.  757  6181  3980  2954 
Pseudo-R2  0.066  0.032  0.142  0.14 
Note:  Estimations  are  done  using  a  logit  model.  CEER  stands  for  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  Russia  and  former 
Yugoslavia. Additional control variables used: month of entry into unemployment and time between entry and interview. 
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
20 Table 5: Matching Results: Reservation Wage and Number of Search Channels
 
Comparison  Outcome  ATET  s.e.  t-value  “Treated”  “Untreated”  Oﬀ support  Bias after  Median bias 
variable  matching  after matching 
CEER migr.: High vs. Low η  log φ  -0.039  0.023  -1.649  466  291  9  2.296  2.098 
s  0.458  0.133  3.42  466  291  9  2.296  2.098 
Natives: High vs. Low η  log φ  -0.030  0.008  -3.758  3516  2665  0  0.627  0.482 
s  0.220  0.043  5.068  3516  2665  0  0.627  0.482 
High η: CEER vs. Natives  log φ  -0.009  0.018  -0.512  466  3513  1  1.908  1.643 
s  0.152  0.089  1.695  466  3513  1  1.908  1.643 
Low η: CEER vs. Natives  log φ  0.009  0.021  0.398  291  2663  5  2.041  1.387 
s  -0.144  0.112  -1.286  291  2663  5  2.041  1.387 
Notes:  CEER stands for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and former Yugoslavia. We apply kernel (Epanechnikov) 
matching with common support; for the bandwidth we follow Silverman’s rule-of-thumb and use 0.06. Standard errors 
are based on 1000 bootstrap replications. Extensive sensitivity analyses are available on request by the authors. Results 
are not sensitive to the kernel or bandwidth choice. Estimations are done using the PSMATCH2 package by Leuven and 
Sianesi. 
Matching quality: we report the mean (median) standardized bias after matching. In addition, we show the number of 
individuals in each group (“treated” and “untreated”) and the number of individuals lost due to missing common support 
(oﬀ support). 
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 Figure 1: Propensity Score Distributions for the Diﬀerent Comparisons
 
CEER migrants η = 5 − 10 vs. CEER migrants η = 0 − 4.  Natives η = 5 − 10 vs. Natives η = 0 − 4 
CEER migrants η = 5 − 10 vs. Natives η = 5 − 10.  CEER migrants η = 0 − 4 vs. Natives η = 0 − 4 
Note: Propensity score estimation results are in Table 4. Individuals with high participation expectations (η = 5 − 10) 
are depicted in the upper half, individuals with low participation expectations (η = 0 − 4) in the lower half. Migrants 
from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and former Yugoslavia (CEER) are depicted in the upper half, natives in 
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